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Abstract
Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) develop a model of police search and offender behavior. Their model implies that if police are unprejudiced the rate of
guilt should not vary across groups. Using data from Interstate 95 in Maryland,
they find equal guilt rates for African-Americans and whites and conclude that
the data is not consistent with racial prejudice against African-Americans. This
paper generalizes the model of Knowles, Persico, and Todd by accounting for the
fact that potential offenders are frequently not observed by the police and by including two different levels of offense severity. The paper shows that for AfricanAmerican males the data is consistent with prejudice against African-American
males, no prejudice, and reverse discrimination depending on the form of equilibria that exists in the economy. Additional analyses based on stratification by
type of vehicle and time of day were conducted, but did not shed any light on the
form of equilibria that best represents the situation in Maryland during the sample
period.

We would like to thank John Knowles and the Maryland ACLU for providing
the data.

1) Introduction
The issue of racial bias in law enforcement has attracted considerable attention in recent
years. For example, on I-95 in the state of Maryland during the period January 1995 - January
1999, African-American motorists accounted for only 18 percent of motorists on the road, but
represented 63 percent of motorists searched (Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 2001).1

The

fundamental problem with this type of racial comparison is that the observed differences may
reflect racial differences on the attributes that police consider when deciding which motorists to
cite, search, or arrest. This classic omitted variable problem has been raised in relation to work
on discrimination in labor and mortgage markets as well, but is especially problematic in the case
of racial profiling. Most law enforcement databases only contain information on the individuals
who the police actually chose to cite, search, or arrest, and little if any information is available to
describe the attributes of the population that the police observed when making these decisions.
Performance approaches have often been considered as an alternative test for prejudicebased discrimination when direct analysis of racial differences is thought to suffer from omitted
variable bias. The logic behind performance analysis is that if decision makers are prejudiced
against minorities then the minorities who are selected must have exhibited superior performance
in order to compensate the decision maker for selecting minority candidates. For example,
Szymanski (2000) finds evidence of prejudice-based discrimination in English soccer leagues by
examining the performance of soccer teams after controlling for each team’s wage bill.
Berkovec, Gabriel, Canner, and Hannan (1998, 1994) examine racial differences in default using
a publicly available FHA foreclosure database, and find no evidence of prejudice-based
discrimination. Ross (2000, 1997, 1996) and Ross and Yinger (2002, Chapter 8) argue that the
default approach does not provide a valid test for discrimination. Specifically, a default analysis
suffers from the same omitted variable bias as direct examinations of lender underwriting
decisions, but the bias works in the opposite direction. 2 Moreover, unlike a direct regression, the

1

Similarly, a study of Tulsa, OK (Ayres, 2000) shows that African-American motorists are much more likely to be
issued traffic citations, have their automobiles searched, or be arrested than white motorists. In Tulsa during the
period June 1995 - June 2000, African-Americans were 14 percent of the population (and most likely a much
smaller fraction of the drivers because of the large number of white suburban commuters and the lower incidence of
automobile ownership among African-Americans), but received 23 percent of citations. Furthermore, AfricanAmerican motorists were 4 times as likely to be arrested (Ayres, 2000).
2
Another criticism discussed by Ross (2000, 1997, 1996) is that performance approaches cannot capture statistical
discrimination, where factors that influence performance are correlated with race and unobserved by both the
researcher and the decision maker, and in the case of mortgage default the existence of statistical discrimination may
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complete elimination of the omitted variable bias results in a test with no power because it also
eliminates the selection bias on which the default approach is based.
A major recent contribution to both the debate over racial bias in law enforcement and
the methodological debate over performance approaches as tests for discrimination is Knowles,
Persico and Todd (2001) (hereafter referred to as KPT). They develop a model of strategic
behavior by police (in their choice of motorists to search) and motorists (in their decision to carry
contraband), and show that the equilibrium involves randomization by both police and offenders.
Their model implies that in equilibrium the probability of guilt for motorists who are searched
should be equal across races, unless the police are prejudiced against one group (in the sense that
the police are willing to search that group even when the expected return is lower than that for
the other group).3 KPT use a dataset on police stops along Interstate-95 in Maryland, collected
by the Maryland ACLU in connection with a lawsuit against the state. They find equal guilt rates
for African-Americans and whites and conclude that the data is not consistent with the
hypothesis of racial prejudice against African-Americans.4
Their model suggests that the omitted variable bias problem may not be present in
performance approaches due to the adjustments made by individuals in equilibrium.

The

randomizing equilibrium suggested in KPT breaks the link between the expected return to an
action and the observed frequency of that action, and in doing so breaks the link between
observed frequency and the unobservable individual attributes that are correlated with the
expected return. Moreover, the model proposed by KPT might be reasonably applied to other
markets. For example, a randomizing equilibrium similar to that proposed by KPT might be
relevant to the labor market separation process where workers and employers must make
decisions about shirking and monitoring (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) or to the mortgage market
where asymmetric information leads to credit rationing and an associated randomization of
underwriting decisions (Besanko and Thakor, 1987; and Calem and Stutzer, 1995).
This paper generalizes the KPT model to account for the possibility that potential
offenders are frequently not observed by the police (which creates the possibility that some types
bias the default test away from finding discrimination. See Borooah (2001) for a discussion of statistical
discrimination in the context of racial bias in policing.
3
Intuitively, this equality holds because potential offenders adjust their behavior in response to the possibility of
being searched by the police. Those who may appear to have the most to gain from carrying contraband will also be
the most likely searched if they do not adjust their behavior.
4
KPT, as well as Ayres (2000), use microdata drawn from a specific geographic area. See Donohue and Levitt
(2001) for an analysis of racial differences in arrests using aggregate data across 134 metropolitan areas.
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do not randomize), and by including two different levels of offense severity.5 Multiple types of
equilibria exist in models where potential offenders may not be observed by the police, and the
test applied in KPT only provides a valid test for prejudice for the class of equilibria where all
potential offenders randomize. Using the model with imperfect observation and two offense
levels, this paper develops valid tests for prejudice for each class of equilibria. The paper shows
that the Maryland data is consistent with prejudice against African-American males, with no
prejudice, and with reverse discrimination, depending on the assumption about which
equilibrium is being played. Additional empirical analysis is conducted in an attempt to identify
the form or forms of equilibria that are consistent with the data. An analysis using a time of day
variable is not consistent with any form of equilibria considered and suggests that other
maintained assumptions, such as uniform returns to arrest or uniform search costs, may be
violated in the data.
These results suggest that theory is unlikely to solve the omitted variables problem often
associated with tests for racial prejudice and discrimination in law enforcement or in any other
markets. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
from KPT. Sections 3 and 4 present the model extensions and empirical analyses, respectively.
Section 5 briefly summarizes the results and discusses the broader implications of these findings.
2) The Basic Model
KPT develop a model that has two types of actors – a continuum of motorists and a
continuum of police officers. Each motorist is characterized by (c, r), where r є {A, W} is the
motorist’s race (either African-American (A) or white (W)), and c is a continuous variable that
represents the motorist’s nonracial characteristics. Note that c is observable to the police, but is
unobserved (or only partially observed) by the researcher. Given their characteristics, and the
anticipated probability of being searched by the police, motorists choose whether or not to carry
drugs. Each motorist receives a default payoff of 0 from not carrying drugs (whether or not she is
searched). If a motorist of type (c, r) chooses to carry drugs, she receives a payoff of v(c, r) if not
searched and – j(c, r) if searched.

5

Persico (2002) extends the KPT model in a number of directions, but does not deal with the particular issues that
we focus on.
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The police observe each motorist’s characteristics (c, r), and decide whether or not to
search. Crucially, KPT assume that, for any type (c, r), the police can choose any search
probability γ є [0, 1]. The police have the following objective function: to maximize expected
benefits (where the benefit from a successful search is normalized to 1), net of the cost to the
police of searching cars. This cost can depend on the motorist’s race, and is denoted by tW, tA є
(0, 1), for r = W, A, respectively. KPT define the preferences of the police as being “prejudiced”
against A’s if tW < tA (i.e. if the police have lower costs of searching A’s, for a given benefit).
The game between motorists and the police does not have a pure strategy equilibrium. To
see the intuition for this, suppose some type (c, r) were to decide to always carry drugs; then, the
police would always search motorists of this type. But, given that they will always be searched,
this type of motorist is better off not carrying drugs (thereby receiving a payoff of 0 rather than –
j(c, r)). Similarly, if some type (c, r) were to never carry drugs, the best response of the police
would be to never search that type; however, given that one is never searched, a motorist’s best
response (for v(c, r) > 0) is to carry drugs.6
Thus, KPT analyze a mixed-strategy equilibrium, where motorists randomize over
whether to carry drugs, and the police randomize over whether to search. In this equilibrium, it is
possible that a motorist’s probability of being searched depends on race. However, if police are
unprejudiced (i.e. tW = tA ≡ t), then it follows that the probability of guilt (denoted D) for
motorists of each race is the same in equilibrium – i.e.
D(W) = D(A) = t
If this is the case, then any difference in the search probabilities across the races can be
interpreted as “statistical discrimination” (in the sense of being caused by the efforts of the police
to apprehend motorists carrying drugs), rather than being attributable to prejudice.
3) Extensions to the Basic Model
Our objective in this section is to extend the basic KPT model sketched above in two
distinct directions. The first of these relates to what we term “imperfect observation.” As
highlighted above, KPT assume that, for any type (c, r), the police can choose any search
probability γ є [0, 1]. We modify this by allowing for the possibility that not all motorists are
6

Of course, it is possible that some types of motorists receive a zero or negative payoff from carrying drugs, even
when facing a zero probability of search. However, such types will never carry or be searched in equilibrium, and so
will not appear in the data on police searches.
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observed by the police. If police do not observe all motorists, equilibria may exist in which some
agents do not randomize. In those equilibria, racial differences in the distribution of c will be
correlated with guilt probability, and an empirical test that does not control for c will not be
valid. Secondly, we allow for different levels of offense severity – in particular, while KPT allow
each motorist only a binary choice of whether or not to carry drugs, we expand this choice set to
permit motorists to choose between carrying no drugs, committing a low-severity offense, and
committing a high-severity offense. Potential offenders sort over low and high severity offenses
based on c in equilibrium. For equilibria involving non-randomizing offenders, offense severity
can be used to restrict the sample to randomizers providing valid tests for prejudice.
3.1) Imperfect Observation
A crucial assumption of KPT’s model is that the police observe all motorists, and can
choose to search any motorist with probability one. In these circumstances, they argue that: “For
our test to fail, we would need to have a fraction of “crazy” criminals who are not deterred even
if they know for sure that they are going to be caught” (KPT, p. 214, fn. 16). This assumption
requires that the police are omniscient (or at least omnipresent), and thus seems to strain
credibility. A simple generalization of the KPT model is thus to assume that the police do not
necessarily observe every motorist with certainty; rather, there is a probability m є (0, 1) that any
given motorist is observed.7 We reinterpret the probability of search γ є [0, 1] as the probability
that the police search a motorist, conditional on observing her. Thus, the highest feasible
unconditional probability of search is m; this occurs if the police always search a given type
contingent on observing that type (i.e. set γ = 1 for that type).
If the motorist is observed (with probability m), then she faces a γ probability of search. If
the motorist is not observed (with probability (1 – m)), she gets the payoff v if she carries drugs.
Thus, KPT’s Eq. (1) (p. 209) – the expected payoff to a motorist of type (c, r) from carrying
drugs – now becomes:
m(– γ(c, r)j(c, r) + (1 – γ(c, r))v(c, r)) + (1 – m)v(c, r)

7

(1)

The data includes all searches carried out on a stretch of I-95 in Maryland between 1995 and 1999. There are many
reasons why the police may not have observed every motorist who traveled within or through the state during this
period, such as the limited resources and/or limited attention of the police. In fact, many variables that influence the
decision to search may only be apparent after the police have stopped the vehicle. Police only have the resources to
stop a very small fraction of all vehicles and even a small fraction of people who commit traffic violations, and thus
police can only observe many attributes relevant to search for a small fraction of motorists. In practice, m may be
quite small.
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The motorist will be willing to randomize if the expression above equals 0. Rearranging, we
obtain the following expression (analogous to that in KPT, p. 211) for the critical value γ*(c, r)
that makes type (c, r) willing to randomize:
v ( c, r )
(2)
m( v (c, r ) + j (c, r ))
In KPT’s model, γ*(c, r) < 1 for any type (c, r): every type of motorist is willing to randomize

γ * ( c, r ) =

for some feasible search probability γ*(c, r). Here, in contrast, since (1/m) > 1, it is possible that
γ*(c, r) > 1 for some types of motorists, so that there are some types who are not willing to
randomize for any feasible γ. These types will carry drugs with probability 1, and the police will
set γ = 1 for these types (i.e. will search them whenever they are observed). It is important to
stress that such a motorist is not “crazy” (in the sense used by KPT, p. 214, fn. 16), because she
is not facing an unconditional probability of search of one. For those types that always carry
drugs, the rewards are sufficient to outweigh a probability m of being searched.
Our seemingly minor change in assumptions has quite drastic consequences for the
equilibrium, and for the validity of KPT’s test for prejudice. These can be most easily explained
in the simple case where c (like r) is binary (say, c є {0, 1}); as will be explained below, this
does not involve any significant loss of generality. When c є {0, 1}, KPT’s mixed-strategy
equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
1) the police randomize by setting γ*(0, W), γ*(0, A), γ*(1, W), γ*(1, A) є (0,1)
2) all motorists randomize by setting the probability of carrying drugs (denoted by P*(G))
to P*(G | 0, W) = P*(G | 1, W) = tW and P*(G | 0, A) = P*(G | 1, A) = tA
where P*(G | c, r) denotes the equilibrium probability of guilt of a motorist, conditional on the
motorist’s type (c, r): i.e. the probability with which motorists of type (c, r) choose to carry
drugs.
Consider a situation where γ*(1, A), γ*(1, W) ≥ 1 (i.e. there does not exist an equilibrium
where the police randomize over searching motorists of type c = 1), while γ*(0, W), γ*(0, A) < 1
(so that the police are willing to randomize over searching motorists of type c = 0). Thus,
motorists of type c = 1 will always carry drugs; for convenience, we will refer to type c = 1 as
“dealers” (and to type c = 0 as “nondealers”) because the former receive a larger net benefit from
carrying drugs (this is of course without loss of generality, as the labeling of types is arbitrary).
6

Note that we focus on “racially symmetric” strategy profiles.

Alternative, non-symmetric

profiles exist where, for example γ*(1, A), γ*(0, A) ≥ 1 and γ*(1, W), γ*(0, W) < 1. These
equilibria, however, are not consistent with the empirical evidence because neither white nor
African-American motorists have guilty rates near one.
For the police to be willing to randomize over searching motorists of type c = 0, it has to
be the case that:
mP*(G | 0, W) = tW
and

mP*(G | 0, A) = tA

i.e. the expected payoff of the police is zero (the benefit to police from an arrest is normalized to
1, so the expected payoff is the (unconditional) probability of arrest, minus the cost of search).
For motorists of type c = 0 to be willing to randomize, it has to be that case that (tW/m) < 1 and
(tA/m) < 1. This is analogous to KPT’s assumption that tW < 1 and tA < 1 (p. 209).8 Given

these

assumptions, we can characterize a mixed-strategy equilibrium as follows:
1) the police randomize over c = 0 types by setting γ*(0, W), γ*(0, A) є (0,1)
2) the police always search c = 1 types whenever they are observed: i.e. γ*(1, W) = γ*(1, A)
= 1)
3) motorists of type c = 0 randomize by setting the probability of carrying drugs to P*(G | 0,
W) = tW/m and P*(G | 0, A) = tA/m
4) motorists of type c =1 always carry drugs – i.e. P*( G | 1, W) = P*(G | 1, A) = 1
Now consider the empirical implications of this equilibrium. Suppose initially that the
distribution of types is identical across races – i.e.
Pr[c = 1 | r = A] = Pr[c = 1 | r = W] and Pr[c = 0 | r = A] = Pr[c = 0 | r = W]
Under these circumstances, if there is no prejudice (i.e. tW = tA = t), then it follows that:
D(W) = D(A) = t
So the KPT test for prejudice remains valid. However, note that in our extension the validity of
this test depends crucially on the distribution of nonrace characteristics c across races. For
instance, suppose that
8

If this is not true, then either one or both of types (0, W) and (0, A) will always carry drugs; this case is
uninteresting, because it would mean that the data is completely uninformative about police prejudice. Hence, we
restrict attention to the case where (tW/m) < 1, (tA/m) < 1.
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Pr[c = 1 | r = A] > Pr[c = 1 | r = W]
(so that a larger fraction of A’s (relative to W’s) are “dealers”). In the equilibrium specified
above, P*(G | 1, ·) = 1 for dealers of both races. Thus, police search behavior when a c = 1 type
is observed is uninformative about police prejudice. This is because, by assumption, tW, tA є (0,
1); hence, γ*(1, W) = γ*(1, A) = 1 is consistent with any admissible tW and tA. On the other hand,
as c = 0 types of both races are randomizing, the KPT argument applies: if tW = tA = t, then it
follows that P*(G | 0, W) = P*(G | 0, A) = t.
When there are more dealers among A’s than among W’s, the fraction of (1, A) types
who are found guilty (as a fraction of all A’s searched) will be larger than the corresponding
fraction among W’s. Combining this with the equal values of P* for c = 0 types of both races, it
follows that if the police are unprejudiced, then the observed probability of guilt has to be higher
for A’s (i.e D(A) > D(W)). In other words, observing equal D’s for the two races may well be
consistent with police prejudice. Thus, the KPT test for prejudice is not valid when the
equilibrium generating the observed outcomes is of the form specified above.
Finally, note that while we have assumed that c is a discrete variable for expositional
ease, the basic argument above is unaffected by assuming a continuous c. In KPT’s model, for
each type (c, r), there exists some search probability γ*(c, r) < 1 for which that type is willing to
randomize. Once we introduce imperfect observation (m < 1), the expression for this probability
is given by Eq. (2) above. When m < 1, if there is any c for which γ*(c, r) ≥ 1, then the KPT test
is no longer valid. Such a type would set P*(G) = 1, and the police would set γ*(c, r) = 1; the
latter’s search behavior would not be informative about the presence of prejudice. Note,
moreover, that for lower values of m, it becomes more reasonable to suppose that γ* ≥ 1 for some
type. Thus, unless there are strong grounds for believing that m = 1, it appears unreasonable to
restrict attention to the case where all types of motorists randomize.
3.2) Offense Severity
In this section, we retain the assumption of imperfect observability, and extend the KPT
model in another direction, namely to consider offenses of varying severity. In their empirical
analysis, KPT consider a number of different definitions of guilt, taking into account variations
in the quantity and type of drugs carried by motorists. However, their theoretical model only
allows only two (pure strategy) choices for the motorist: to carry or not carry drugs. Here, we
introduce the possibility that there are two levels of offenses – a less severe offense (such as
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carrying a small quantity of drugs), denoted by L, and a high-severity offense (such as carrying a
large quantity of drugs or carrying “hard” drugs), denoted by H. Each motorist thus has three
pure strategies: to carry nothing (denoted N), L and H.
Let the payoff from committing L be denoted by vL(c, r) if not searched, and – jL(c, r) if
searched. Denote the payoff from committing H as vH(c, r) if not searched, and – jH(c, r) if
searched. Let GH and GL denote the events that a motorist is guilty of offenses H and L,
respectively, and let DH and DL be the guilt probabilities for each offense. As before, the payoff
from not carrying is zero, whether or not the motorist is searched. Also as before, let γ(c, r) be
the probability of search chosen by the police, given that the motorist is observed, and let m be
the probability of being observed. Once again, we assume that c є {0, 1} for expositional
convenience (although the intuition carries through to the case where c is continuous).
When there are offenses of differing severity, it seems natural to assume that the benefits
derived by the police from arresting motorists for each offense are different. That is, it appears
likely that (normalizing the return from an arrest for H to 1) the return from an arrest for L would
be b, where (typically) one would expect that b є (0, 1). However, under these assumptions, it is
very difficult to find any testable restrictions on the data that are implied by the absence of police
prejudice. In particular, the test employed by KPT is invalid, even in those circumstances
identified below (as equilibrium 1a-b) where it remains valid under the assumption that b = 1.9
Thus, in order to preserve at least some possibility that the KPT is valid, we maintain for now the
assumption that the police receive equal returns from arrests for each offense. In the next section,
we discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption, in the light of our empirical results.
Consider a motorist of given type (c, r): she can choose any of the following classes of
mixed strategies – (i) play N, (ii) play L, (iii) play H, (iv) randomize between N and L, (v)
randomize between N and H, (vi) randomize between L and H, (vii) randomize between N, L,
and H. Clearly, there are many possible cases, even when c is assumed to be binary. However,
given the assumptions above, it is possible to eliminate most of these cases. For example,
consider the class of equilibria where some type(s) randomize over L and H. Recall that
equilibria exist where motorists randomize, for instance, between N and L because for any given
set of parameter values, there exists a search probability for which the motorist is indifferent
9

In part of their empirical analysis, KPT assume, in effect, that b = 0; under this assumption, their test is valid if all
types of motorists are randomizing. However, the validity of their test does not extend to the case where b is strictly
positive.
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between N and L. In contrast, as a motorist who randomizes over L and H will always carry
some quantity of drugs, the police will not adjust their behavior in response to the randomization,
instead simply setting γ = 1 (i.e. the unconditional probability of search = m). A type (c, r) will
randomize between L and H if:
(1 – m)vH(c, r) – mjH(c, r) = (1 – m)vL(c, r) – mjL(c, r)

(3)

The underlying parameter spaces for m and for the motorists’ payoffs (the v’s and j’s) are
continuous. Thus, it is clear that the condition above can only hold for a subset of the parameter
space that is of measure zero – for generic parameter values, equilibria where some type(s)
randomize over L and H can be ruled out. This argument can also be extended to equilibria
where some type(s) randomize over N, L and H: for generic parameter values, these cases should
collapse to randomization over either N and L or over N and H.
The possible equilibria can be further restricted by imposing a requirement of consistency
with the basic features of the observed data. The data suggest that both offenses were committed
in equilibrium by members of each race. Thus, equilibria in which neither crime, or only one
kind, is committed can be ruled out as being inconsistent with the observed data. We also
continue to restrict attention to equilibria in what we term “racially symmetric” strategy profiles.
These are strategy profiles for which the following is true: for any given c, types (c, A) and (c,
W) play the same class of strategy (note that this does not require that, for mixed strategies, the
two races have to mix with identical probabilities). As discussed earlier, non-symmetric strategy
profiles are also inconsistent with the observed data.
We are thus left with the following six cases to consider. They are grouped in symmetric
pairs (noting that the labeling of types as c = 0 and c = 1 is arbitrary):

10

Fully Randomizing Equilibria:
1a) For each r, motorists of type (0, r) randomize between N and H (i.e. choose P*(GH |
0, r) є (0, 1) and P*(GL | 0, r) = 0), while motorists of type (1, r) randomize between N
and L (i.e. choose P*(GL | 0, r) є (0, 1) and P*(GH | 0, r) = 0); the police set γ*(0, r) є (0,
1) and γ*(1, r) є (0, 1)
1b) For each r, motorists of type (0, r) randomize between N and L (i.e. choose P*(GL | 0,
r) є (0, 1) and P*(GH | 0, r) = 0), while motorists of type (1, r) randomize between N and
H (i.e. choose P*(GH | 0, r) є (0, 1) and P*(GL | 0, r) = 0); the police set γ*(0, r) є (0, 1)
and γ*(1, r) є (0, 1)
Assuming one of these types of equilibria prevails, one can test for prejudice simply by
comparing probabilities of guilt (of each offense) for each race. This is essentially the test that
KPT implement. However, this is not a valid test if the observed data is generated by equilibrium
behavior other than that of case 1a-b).
Equilibria with Randomization over Low-level Offenses:
2a) For each r, motorists of type (0, r) randomize between N and L (i.e. choose P*(GL | 0,
r) є (0, 1) and P*(GH | 0, r) = 0), while motorists of type (1, r) play H (i.e. choose P*(GH |
0, r) = 1 and P*(GL | 0, r) = 0); the police set γ*(0, r) є (0, 1) and γ*(1, r) = 1
2b) For each r, motorists of type (0, r) play H (i.e. choose P*(GH | 0, r) = 1 and P*(GL | 0,
r) = 0), while motorists of type (1, r) randomize between N and L (i.e. choose P*(GL | 0,
r) є (0, 1) and P*(GH | 0, r) = 0); the police set γ*(0, r) = 1 and γ*(1, r) є (0, 1)
Here, a subset of motorists (identifiable to the police but not to the econometrician) are playing a
strategy of always carrying a large quantity of drugs (i.e. committing H). For these motorists, a
comparison of probabilities of guilt across races will not be informative about police prejudice.
This is because, by assumption, tW, tA є (0, 1); hence, γ*(c, W) = γ*(c, A) = 1 is consistent with
any admissible tW and tA. In this setting, a valid test for prejudice requires omitting all
observations where a motorist is found guilty of H, and testing for the equality of probabilities of
guilt (of offense L) for the remaining sample.
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Equilibria with Randomization over High-level Offenses:
3a) For each r, motorists of type (0, r) play L (i.e. choose P*(GL | 0, r) = 1 and P*(GH | 0,
r) = 0), while motorists of type (1, r) randomize between N and H (i.e. choose P*(GH | 0,
r) є (0, 1) and P*(GL | 0, r) = 0); the police set γ*(0, r) = 1 and γ*(1, r) є (0, 1)
3b) For each r, motorists of type (0, r) randomize between N and H (i.e. choose P*(GH |
0, r) є (0, 1) and P*(GL | 0, r) = 0), while motorists of type (1, r) play L (i.e. choose
P*(GL | 0, r) = 1 and P*(GH | 0, r) = 0); the police set γ*(0, r) є (0, 1) and γ*(1, r) = 1
This represents the case where a subset of motorists always carry a small quantity (i.e. commit
L). Thus, a valid test for prejudice requires omitting all observations where a motorist is found
guilty of L, and testing for the equality of probabilities of guilt (of offense H) for the remaining
sample.
4) Empirical Analysis
The data used by KPT were collected as part of a lawsuit settlement between the ACLU
and the Maryland State Police. The settlement required the state to maintain detailed records on
motorist searches and to file quarterly reports with the court and the ACLU. The data contains
1,590 observations on all motor vehicle searches on a section of Interstate 95 in Maryland. The
data provide information on the race and gender of the driver; the make, model, and year of the
automobile; date, time, and location of the search, and finally whether any controlled substances
are found and if found the amount and type.10
Our model differs from KPT in two ways: 1) Police do not always observe potential
offenders and as a result some types may offend with certainty, and 2) Potential offenders choose
between two levels of offense and different types may separate over these offense levels. The
empirical tests arising from these extensions suggest stratifying the sample by guilt severity for
those that offend.11 Therefore, the first task of this paper is to choose a stratification of offenses.
10

After obtaining permission from the Maryland Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, John Knowles
provided us with the complete sample used in KPT.
11
It should be noted that our empirical analysis focuses on the case where there are multiple levels of offenses, as
well as imperfect observability. When the offense is homogeneous, and imperfect observability may lead to
equilibria with some nonrandomizing agents, a valid test for prejudice is not available given the data limitations. In
particular, information about the distribution of c across races is required. The multiple level of offense extension
addresses this problem by providing predictions about sorting over offense type that can be used to infer information
about c.
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In their empirical analysis, KPT apply increasingly more stringent definitions of guilt starting
with any controlled substance (Guilt 1), eliminating offenses involving amounts marijuana less
than 2 grams (Guilt 2), eliminating offenses involving marijuana only (Guilt 3), and finally only
considering offenses involving felony amounts of contraband. Using these definitions of guilt,
KPT found no evidence of racial prejudice against African-Americans. Guilt frequencies were
nearly identical for white and African-American motorists over all offenses, and after dropping
offenses involving small quantities of marijuana they found higher rates of guilt among AfricanAmericans suggesting reverse discrimination by state police.
Table 1 presents a similar breakdown of offenses. The sample contains 1473 searches of
white and African-American motorists of which 1007 or 68 percent are of African-American
motorists. The first two columns show the distribution of searches by race over offense category.
The first row is the fraction of searches for which no contraband was found. The next three rows
represent the fraction of searches where misdemeanor offenses were identified involving small
amounts of marijuana, larger, non-felony amounts of marijuana, and hard drugs, respectively.
The final category shows the fraction of searches locating felony amounts of contraband.
The racial pattern of offenses is striking. Although no racial differences in the likelihood
of guilt exist overall, African-Americans are more likely to be guilty of felonies, and whites have
higher guilty rates on misdemeanors for any of the three offense categories. Columns three and
four show the frequency of guilt divided between misdemeanors and felony. African-Americans
have a 6 percentage point lower guilty rate for misdemeanors overall and a 9 percentage point
higher guilty rate for felonies. Racial differences in the pattern of guilt are statistically significant
with less than a 0.001 chance of error for both the modified KPT categorization and the
categorization of offenses into felony and non-felony.
Our theoretical analysis suggests that KPT’s strategy of simply dropping low level
offenses is not necessarily an appropriate way to handle offense heterogeneity. In fact, the
identification of an appropriate strategy depends upon the type of equilibrium arising in the
economy. Under the assumptions that equilibria 1a-b hold, where all types randomize, and that
the police return to identifying guilty motorists does not vary by level of guilt, the appropriate
test is the primary test provided by KPT where overall frequencies of guilt are compared for
white and African-American motorists. Table 2 Panel A shows the results for these tests overall
and by gender. African-Americans have a three percentage point higher guilty rate overall, but
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the difference is not statistically significant. No meaningful racial difference exists in the
frequency of guilt for African-American males, but a 22 percentage point difference in guilty
rates, which is statistically significant at the 2 percent level, for females suggests prejudice
against white females or reverse discrimination.
On the other hand, if equilibria 2a-b or 3a-b are assumed to describe the behavior of
motorists and police, one type of motorist will randomize and the other type will offend with
certainty. Under these circumstances, the correct strategy is to compare frequency of guilt after
dropping the type that offends with certainty, which can be accomplished by simply dropping the
offense level that is chosen by the type that offends with certainty. In equilibria 2a-b, some types
of motorists commit high level offenses or felonies with certainty while in equilibrium 3a-b,
some types commit low level offenses with certainty. In each of these equilibria, some types
randomize, and an unbiased test for prejudice can be obtained from a sample consisting only of
these types. For equilibria 2a-b, since certain types commit high level offenses with certainty,
those types are never not guilty or guilty of low level offenses, a sample consisting only of those
types that are randomizing is obtained by dropping those that are guilty of high level offenses.
Similarly, a sample consisting only of those types that are randomizing is obtained in equilibria
3a-b by dropping those guilty of low level offenses.
Panels B and C of Table 2 show the results for these alternative tests of prejudice. If some
types commit high level infractions or felonies with certainty (equilibrium 2a-b), whites have a 4
percentage point higher rate of guilt overall, but this result only exhibits very weak statistical
significance at the 12 percent confidence level. It should be noted, however, that this difference
represents a 7 percentage point change in the guilt frequency differences when compared to the
results from panel A. For equilibria 3a-b, whites have a 13 percentage point lower guilty
frequency, providing evidence of reverse discrimination with a high level of statistical
significance. The shift from equilibria 1a-b to equilibria 3a-b also shifts the estimated difference
by 7 percentage points, but in the opposite direction as the shift to equilibria 2a-b. While formal
approaches do not exist to compare estimates across potential equilibria, these seven percentage
point differences are quite meaningful given that KPT and this paper often find racial differences
of 5 to 6 percentage points to be statistically significant.
This stratification also affects the empirical implications for the male and female
subsamples. For the male subsample, the differences increase to 5 percentage points and are
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statistically significant at the 6 percent level. Racial differences for the female subsample falls to
9 percentage points and are not statistically significant. On the other hand, for equilibrium 3a-b),
whites have a lower rate of guilt overall and in both the male and female subsamples with
differences ranging between 10 and 24 percentage points, and these results are statistically
significant at better than the 0.1 percent level.
Clearly, the interpretation of data depends strongly on assumptions concerning the form
of equilibria. An assumption that equilibrium 2a-b holds reverses the findings of no prejudice
against African-American males and eliminates the finding of prejudice against white females.
On the other hand, the results for equilibrium 3a-b imply the exact opposite finding reverse
discrimination against white males and maintaining the finding of reverse discrimination against
white females.
In an attempt to shed more light on these issues, we continue our empirical analysis in
order to examine whether some additional forms of equilibria can be ruled out by the data.
Specifically, the supplementary analysis considers variables in the sample that might provide a
proxy for the police’s assessment of a potential offenders return to offending (c). Based on the
theoretical model, any variable that is correlated with the return to offending will be correlated
with offenders’ level of guilt. The level of guilt comparison must be made conditional on the
guilt of individual searched in order to assure that the proxy variables are chosen based on their
relationship with offense level rather than a relationship with the likelihood of guilt.
Two such variables are vehicle type, which is divided between vehicles that are owned by
the motorist and those that are owned by a third-party, and time of day, which is divided between
the periods of 6 AM to 4 PM (workday) and 4 PM to 6 AM (other times). The fraction of all
offenses that are felonies are 35 percentage points higher for third-party than owned vehicles and
almost 10 percentage points lower for the workday period than the rest of the day. Both
differences exhibit a high level of statistical significance (see Table 3).
Table 3 also shows the fraction guilty and the fraction African-American by both vehicle
type and time of day. While guilt frequencies do not vary by vehicle type, the frequency of guilt
is more than 5 percentage points lower during the workday, and the differences are statistically
significant at the 2 percent level. This finding is not consistent with either the KPT model nor
with a fully randomizing equilibrium in our model. These differences can only be explained if
either some types offend with certainty or the police return to search varies by type of offense.
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Finally, both of these proxy variables are highly correlated with race. In the sample of searched
vehicles, third party vehicles are 18 percentage points more likely to be driven by AfricanAmerican motorists as compared to vehicles that are owned by the motorists. Similarly, searches
that are conducted during the workday period are 9 percentage points less likely to involve
African-American motorists.
Table 4 presents additional tests under the assumption that either equilibria 2a-b or 3a-b
hold and that either vehicle type or time of day provides a reasonable proxy for the potential
offender type that determines both offender and police search behavior. Stratification by the
proxy variable should shift the proportion of the sample either away from or towards types who
offend with certainty and as a result either reduce or increase the bias in the traditional KPT test
for prejudice. For vehicle type, the own vehicle sample should have lower bias under equilibrium
2a-b than the unconditional guilt frequency test of KPT, and the third-party sample should have
lower bias under equilibrium 3a-b.
The results provide a partial confirmation of the findings in Table 2. The own-vehicle
sample does not provide any evidence of prejudice against African-Americans as was found in
Table 2 for equilibrium 3. The third-party sample, however, identifies a 13 percentage point
higher rate of guilt for African-Americans, which is consistent with the Table 2 results for
equilibrium 4 and implies reverse discrimination against whites. Of course, the test for
equilibrium 3 may have weak power because the own vehicle subsample contains most of the
overall sample and the fraction of felony offenses only fell by about 6 percentage points from 28
in the full sample to 22 in the own vehicle subsample. On the other hand, the fraction of felony
offenses is almost 30 percentage points higher in the third-party vehicle than in the overall
sample.
The results for the time of day variable, however, are quite at odds with the previous
findings from Table 2. African-Americans are 7 percentage points more likely to be guilty in
workday sample, which should have reduced bias under equilibrium 2a-b; and 5 percentage
points less likely to be guilty in the other time sample, which should have reduced bias under
equilibrium 3a-b. The racial differences are only statistically significant for the workday sample,
but regardless the results imply reverse discrimination against whites for equilibrium 2a-b and at
least suggest prejudice against African-Americans for equilibrium 3a-b. On the other hand,
Table 2 provided strong evidence of reverse discrimination under the assumption that
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equilibrium 3a-b held, as well as some evidence of prejudice under equilibrium 2a-b.
Conditional on the earlier assumptions in the model, this contradiction suggests that the data is
not consistent with equilibria where some types offend with certainty.
In summary, the results for own vehicle do not provide any more information than Table
2. Guilt frequencies do not vary across vehicle type, which is consistent with the assumptions of
equilibria where all types randomize and of equal returns to police across offense types. The
stratification analysis is also broadly consistent with the findings in panels B and C after
accounting for the weak power provided by the own vehicle subsample. Therefore, vehicle type
does not allow us to rule out any of the equilibria considered in the paper.
On the other hand, given the maintained assumptions in the model, the results for time of
day are inconsistent with all of the equilibria forms considered. Equilibria 1a-b are rejected
because guilty rates are not equal across the time of day variable that is clearly observable to
police.

Equilibria 2a-b and 3a-b are rejected because the analyses in Tables 2 and 4 are

contradictory. If the behavior of agents is described by either equilibria 2a-b or 3a-b, Table 2
provides unbiased tests for prejudice, and the stratification by time of day in Table 4 should
reduce the magnitude of the bias in the test relative to the KPT test based on unconditional guilt
frequencies. This stratification produces racial differences in guilt that are further away from the
Table 2 Panel B and C estimates as compared to the KPT estimates in Panel A. These findings
suggest that one or more of the maintained assumptions in the theoretical model are incorrect.
One assumption imposed in the multiple offense level model is that the return to police is
the same across offense types. Guilt rates are over 5 percentage points lower during the workday.
This finding can be explained if return varies by offense type.

The finding, however, is

consistent with a model where police accept a lower frequency of successful searches, guilt rate,
during the workday in exchange for higher return from the offense type that is more common
during the workday. Therefore, the empirical relationship between time of day and guilt can only
be explained by differences in the return to offense type if we accept the counter-intuitive
implication that police value misdemeanor arrests more than felony arrests.
Another alternative explanation might involve the assumption that the cost of search is
not same between workday and other times. Specifically, in order to be consistent with the
findings, the cost of search would have to be lower during the workday and as a result police
accept in equilibrium both lower rates of felony arrests and lower rates of guilt overall from
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those searches. This assumption appears more reasonable than the higher return to misdemeanors
assumption. In fact, the frequency of guilt does not differ by type of vehicle, which is predicted
by the model if separate randomizing equilibria exist during the workday and other times.
Nonetheless, identifying appropriate interpretations of these findings is dramatically more
problematic under the possibility that both search costs may vary over observables and returns to
arrests vary by type of offense.
5) Conclusion
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on performance-based measures of
discrimination. In particular, we have reexamined the theoretical and empirical framework
developed by Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) to analyze racial bias in motor vehicle searches.
We have generalized the KPT model to account for the possibility that potential offenders are not
always observed by the police, and by including two different levels of offense severity. While
these extensions are quite straightforward, they lead to the existence of multiple types of
equilibria, including some in which potential offenders do not randomize, but rather offend with
certainty. The validity of KPT’s simple empirical test for prejudice depends crucially on which
of these types of equilibria prevail, as well as on a number of other maintained assumptions. Our
empirical analysis shows that the data used by KPT (on motor vehicle searches in Maryland) is
consistent with prejudice against African-American males, with no prejudice, and with reverse
discrimination, depending on which equilibrium is being played. Additional analysis using the
time of day that searches were carried out casts doubt on the consistency of the data with any of
these equilibria and/or with the maintained assumptions of the model.
The theoretical model in Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) is elegant and appears to
offer a simple solution to the very difficult problem of omitted variables bias in analyses of
discrimination in policing. Their model also might have formed the basis for resolving debates
concerning the existence of discrimination in other markets, such as the labor or mortgage
markets. The results presented above suggest, however, that theory is unlikely to solve the
omitted variables problem often associated with tests for racial prejudice and discrimination in
law enforcement or in any other markets. An alternative solution to these problems is to
determine the factors considered by police during their patrols and undertake efforts to generate
information on the distribution of these attributes in the relevant population of motorists.
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Potential strategies for gathering such information might include the use of traditional trip diaries
(Scott and Kanaroglou, 2002) or random monitoring of roadways to record the incidence of
factors that might lead to police stops.
More recent work by Persico (2002) suggests that even when the randomizing
equilibrium studied by KPT exists, it may not lead to a socially optimal outcome in terms of
minimizing crime. The underlying assumption about police behavior is that it involves
maximizing the probability of arrest (i.e. the number of successful searches), rather than
minimizing the amount of crime. Hence, the search intensities for each race are chosen by the
police to equate guilt rates, and are independent of the elasticities of crime to police auditing.12
Thus, Persico argues that if W’s are more responsive to policing than are A’s, there is no conflict
between the goals of greater fairness (i.e. reducing disparities in the search probabilities across
races) and crime minimization. While the basic intuition of Persico’s results may be robust to
extensions of the model, both the theoretical and empirical analysis in this paper suggests that an
evaluation of the efficiency of reducing racial disparities in search requires consideration of
many more factors than just the elasticity of crime.

12

This feature pertains specifically to the model in Persico (2002), and does not apply to the broader KPT
framework.
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Table 1:
Guilt Probabilities by Race
Definitions of
KPT’s Offense Categories
Misdemeanor vs. Felony
Guilt
Black
White
Black1
White
Not Guilty
66.1
69.1
66.1
69.1
Small Amount
7.9
9.9
Marijuana Only
10.9
13.9
21.9
27.9
Hard Drugs
3.1
4.1
Felony
12.0
3.0
12.0
3.0
Sample Size
466
1007
466
1007
Chi-Square Test
<0.001
<0.001
1. The entry in the third row contains the faction of all non-felony offences.
Table 2:

Tests for Prejudice by Type of Equilibrium
Full Sample
Male Subsample
Panel A: Everyone Randomizes - KPT (Equilibria 1a-b)
White Fraction Guilty
30.9
31.8
Black Fraction Guilty
33.9
33.1
Chi-Square Test
0.261
0.640
Panel B: Felonies Committed with Certainty (Equilibria 2a-b)
White Fraction Guilty
28.8
29.6
Black Fraction Guilty
24.8
24.6
Chi-Square Test
0.122
0.056
Panel C: Misdemeanors Committed with Certainty (Equilibria 3a-b)
White Fraction Guilty
4.2
4.3
Black Fraction Guilty
15.2
14.4
Chi-Square Test
>0.001
>0.001
Sample Size
1473
1357

22

Female Subsample
22.0
44.0
0.018
20.0
28.8
0.322
3.0
27.6
0.004
116

Table 3:

Offense Type, Guilt, and Race Frequencies by Observable Attribute
Vehicle Type
Time of Day
Own
Third-Party
Workday
Other Times
Share of Observations
82.1
17.9
52.8
47.2
Sample Size
1209
264
778
695
Fraction Felony Offenses
Chi-Square Test

21.7

Fraction Guilty
Chi-Square Test

33.2

Fraction Black
Chi-Square Test

65.1

57.1

23.0

>0.001
31.4

30.2

0.588

35.8
0.022

83.3
>0.001

32.4
0.021

64.0

73.2
>0.001

Table 4:
Tests for Prejudice based by Observable Attributes
Definitions of Guilt
Type of Vehicle
Time of Day
Own Vehicle
Third-Party
Workday
Other Times
White Fraction Guilty
32.0
20.5
25.7
38.7
Black Fraction Guilty
33.8
33.6
32.7
33.8
Chi-Square Test
0.524
0.086
0.041
0.338
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